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Michael Rescorla (2020) has recently pointed out that the standard
arguments for Bayesian Conditionalization assume that whenever I
become certain of something, it is true. Most people would reject this
assumption. In response, Rescorla offers an improved Dutch Book
argument for Bayesian Conditionalization that does not make this as-
sumption. My purpose in this paper is two-fold. First, I want to il-
luminate Rescorla’s new argument by giving a very general Dutch
Book argument that applies to many cases of updating beyond those
covered by Conditionalization, and then showing how Rescorla’s ver-
sion follows as a special case of that. Second, I want to show how to
generalise R. A. Briggs and Richard Pettigrew’s Accuracy Dominance
argument to avoid the assumption that Rescorla has identified (Briggs
& Pettigrew, 2018). In both cases, these arguments proceed by first es-
tablishing a very general reflection principle.
Careful formulations of the Bayesian norm of Conditionalization ac-
knowledge that it governs how you should plan to update your credences,
or how you should be disposed to update them. It does not govern how
you should in fact update, or at least not directly. That is, Conditionaliza-
tion does not govern the relationship between your prior credences and
your posterior credences, but rather the relationship between your prior
credences and your plans or dispositions for updating those priors. In par-
ticular, it governs those plans or dispositions you have for updating your
credences in response to a certain sort of learning situation, namely, one in
which you become certain of a proposition.
An updating plan comprises two components:
*Acknowledgements: I am extremely grateful to Michael Rescorla, as well as the referees
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philosophy and the mathematics both improved as a result of heeding their suggestions.
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(i) a partition of the space of possibilities;
(ii) a function that assigns to each element of that partition the posterior
credence function that this plan endorses as a response to that ele-
ment.
When we consider Conditionalization—and we therefore think of someone
with a prior credence function c at time t, who is planning how to respond
to evidence they receive between t and a later time t′ that makes them cer-
tain of something—the partition consists of the following propositions:1,2
I become certain of E1 and nothing stronger by t′.
I become certain E2 and nothing stronger by t′.
...
I become certain of En and nothing stronger by t′.
And the updating plan consists of conditional intentions or dispositions of
the form:
If I become certain of E1 and nothing stronger by t′, then I’ll adopt credence
function c1 at t′.
If I become certain of E2 and nothing stronger by t′, then I’ll adopt credence
function c2 at t′.
...
If I become certain of En and nothing stronger by t′, then I’ll adopt credence
function cn at t′.
Throughout, I assume that E1, . . . , En are mutually exclusive.3 Condition-
alization then says this:
Conditionalization Rationality requires that, if
(i) my credence function at t is c,
(ii) c is defined on the algebra F ,
(ii) my updating plan contains: If I become certain of Ei and noth-
ing stronger by t′, then I’ll adopt credence function ci at t′, and
1I assume throughout that the partition is finite.
2Here, and in the remainder of the paper, I will talk of updating plans to cover both
plans that you explicitly and consciously formulate as well as plans that describe how you
are disposed to update.
3Rescorla (2020) assumes that they are exhaustive as well as exclusive, but it turns out
that isn’t necessary.
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(iii) c(Ei) > 0;
then, for all X in F ,
ci(X) = c(X|Ei) :=
c(XEi)
c(Ei)
That is, at t, I should make a plan to do the following at t′: to condition
my prior credence function c on the strongest proposition of which I be-
come certain at t′, providing my prior assigned positive credence to that
proposition.
In favour of this version of Conditionalization, there are at least four
arguments: two pragmatic, two epistemic. The first pragmatic argument
is David Lewis’s diachronic Dutch Book argument (Lewis, 1999); the sec-
ond is Peter M. Brown’s expected utility argument (Brown, 1976); the first
epistemic argument is Hilary Greaves and David Wallace’s expected accu-
racy argument (Oddie, 1997; Greaves & Wallace, 2006); the second is R. A.
Briggs and Richard Pettigrew’s Accuracy Dominance argument (Briggs &
Pettigrew, 2018). However, as Michael Rescorla (2020) has recently noted,
each of these arguments relies on an assumption, namely, that the strongest
proposition of which you become certain by t′ is true. That is, you never
become certain of a proposition that is false—if you become certain that
it is raining, then it is raining. As a result, if this assumption doesn’t al-
ways hold, then these arguments don’t establish Conditionalization. They
establish only a restricted version of it that applies in those cases where the
assumption holds.
Rescorla offers an improved Dutch Book argument for Conditionaliza-
tion that does not assume that, if you become certain of Ei, then Ei must
be true. My purpose in this paper is two-fold. First, I want to illuminate
Rescorla’s new argument by giving a Dutch Book argument for a general
version of the Reflection Principle that applies to many cases of updat-
ing beyond those covered by Conditionalization, and then showing how
Rescorla’s version follows as a special case of that. Second, I want to show
how to generalise Briggs and Pettigrew’s Accuracy Dominance argument
to avoid the assumption that Rescorla has identified. Indeed, I offer an ac-
curacy dominance argument for the same general version of the Reflection
Principle for which I offer a Dutch Book argument.
1 Two general norms connecting priors and possible
posteriors
Van Fraassen’s generalization of his original Reflection Principle says that,
for each proposition X to which you currently assign a credence, your cur-
rent credence in X should lie in the span of your possible future credences
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in X (van Fraassen, 1995, 1999). That is, your current credence in a par-
ticular proposition should be a weighted average or convex combination
of your possible future credences in that combination. So, if your current
credence in X is x and your possible future credences in X are x1, . . . , xn,
then there should be weights 0 ≤ λ1, . . . , λn ≤ 1 such that ∑ni=1 λi = 1
and x = ∑ni=1 λixi. Jonathan Weisberg (2007) calls this General Credence
Reflection.
I want to consider a slightly stronger principle: your current credence
function should lie in the span of your possible future credence functions.
That is, if your current credence function is c and your possible future cre-
dence functions are c1, . . . , cn, then there should be 0 ≤ λ1, . . . , λn ≤ 1 such
that ∑ni=1 λi = 1 and c = ∑
n
i=1 λici.
4 This is a more general norm than
Conditionalization. Conditionalization covers cases in which you arrive
at your future credence function in a particular way. It applies when you
become certain of something and you set your future credence function by
using your updating plan to respond to that. The principle that interests me
covers those cases and other cases besides: cases in which your evidence
shifts your opinion without making you certain of anything new, such as
in Richard Jeffrey’s case of viewing cloth by candlelight or van Fraassen’s
Judy Benjamin case (Jeffrey, 1965; van Fraassen, 1981).5
There is a weaker and a stronger version of this principle. The one I
sketched in the previous paragraph is the weaker one. Here it is in more
detail. Suppose c is your credence function at t, and R is the set of credence
functions you might have at time t′. That is, c is your prior and R contains
all and only your possible posteriors. We’ll assume throughout that R is
finite. Then the Weak General Reflection Principle says that c should be
in the convex hull of R.6 That is, c should be a convex combination or
weighted sum or weighted average of the credence functions in R. That is:
Weak General Reflection Principle Suppose c is your credence
4To see that this principle is indeed stronger:
(i) if c is in the span of c1, . . . , cn, then c = ∑ni=1 λici, so c(X) = ∑
n
i=1 λici(X), and
therefore c(X) is in the span of c1(X), . . . , cn(X);
(ii) suppose
c(X) = 0.3 c(Y) = 0.6
c1(X) = 0 c1(Y) = 0
c2(X) = 1 c2(Y) = 1
then c(X) is in the span of c1(X), c2(X), and c(Y) is in the span of c1(Y), c2(Y), but
c is not in the span of c1, c2. After all, for any 0 ≤ λ1, λ2 ≤ 1 with λ1 + λ2 = 1,
(λ1c1 + λ2c2)(X) = λ2 = (λ1c1 + λ2c2)(Y), whereas c(X) 6= c(Y).
5van Fraassen (1999), Skyrms (1997), and Huttegger (2013) have also argued that reflec-
tion principles are generalizations of Conditionalization.
6The convex hull of a set is the smallest convex set that contains it. A set is convex when
it contains any mixture of any two elements it contains. Thus, the interior of a circle is
convex, but its circumference is not.
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function at t, and R = {c1, . . . , cn} is the set of credence func-
tions you might have at t′. Then rationality requires that there
is, for each ci in R, a non-negative weighting 0 ≤ λi ≤ 1 such






And the Strong General Reflection Principle says that your prior should
be in the interior of the convex hull of your possible posteriors. That is, it
should be a convex combination or weighted sum or weighted average of
your possible posteriors where the weights are all positive. That is:
Strong General Reflection Principle Suppose c is your cre-
dence function at t, and R = {c1, . . . , cn} is the set of credence
functions you might have at t′. Then rationality requires that
there is, for each ci in R, a positive weighting 0 < λi < 1 such






2 From General Reflection to Conditionalization
As we will see, we can establish Weak GRP via Dutch Book or Accuracy
Dominance arguments; and we can establish Strong GRP via a Dutch Book
argument, but not via an Accuracy Dominance argument. In this section,
I show that we can obtain Conditionalization from either of these. This
is not a particularly novel point. It was noted by van Fraassen when he
introduced his general version of the Reflection Principle (van Fraassen,
1999).
Throughout, we will assume that all credence functions are defined on
the same finite algebra of propositions, F .
Now, suppose first that, between t and t′, you will become certain of
exactly one of E1, . . . , En, where each Ei is in F . And suppose you have an
updating plan defined on each of these possibilities. That is, the partition
on which your updating plan is defined consists of the following proposi-
tions:
I become certain of Ei and nothing stronger by t′,
for i = 1, . . . , n. And the plan itself consists of the following conditionals:
If I become certain of Ei and nothing stronger by t′, then I’ll adopt
credence function ci at t′,
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for i = 1, . . . , n. And suppose finally that your possible future credence
functions are the result of following your updating plan. So R = {c1, . . . , cn}.
Now, suppose that
(i) E1, . . . , En are mutually exclusive propositions, and
(ii) ci(Ei) = 1, for i = 1, . . . , n.
Then, for j = 1, . . . , n,
c(Ej) = ∑ni=1 λici(Ej) by Weak GRP
= λjcj(Ej) since E1, . . . , En are exclusive,
so ci(Ej) = 0 if i 6= j
= λj since cj(Ej) = 1
Thus, for all X in F and Ej
c(XEj) = ∑ni=1 λici(XEj) by Weak GRP
= ∑ni=1 c(Ei)ci(XEj) by above
= c(Ej)cj(XEj) since ci(XEj) = 0 if i 6= j
= c(Ej)cj(X) since cj(Ej) = 1
Thus, if c(Ej) > 0, then cj(X) = c(X|Ej). So the future credence function cj
you plan to adopt if you become certain of Ej is obtained from your prior c
by conditioning it on Ej, providing c assigns positive probability to Ej. This
is what we wished to show. And note: at no point did we assume that you
take yourself to learn Ej only if Ej is true.
3 The Dutch Book argument for GRP
In the Dutch Book argument for Probabilism, we show that, if your cre-
dence function does not obey the axioms of the probability calculus, there
is a series of bets, each of which your credences require you to take, but
which, when added together, lose you money for sure. In the traditional
Dutch Book argument for Conditionalization, we show that, if you plan to
update your prior in some way other than by Conditionalization, then there
is a series of bets, each of which your priors require you to take, and, for
each of your possible posteriors after following the updating plan, there is a
series of bets, each of which those posteriors require you to take, but which,
when added together, lose you money for sure. Rescorla’s improved Dutch
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Book argument for Conditionalization does not require a different series
of bets for each possible posterior; rather, there is a series of bets, each of
which your priors require you to take, and there is a series of bets, each
of which all your possible posteriors require you to take, but which, when
added together, lose you money for sure. The same is true of the Dutch
Book arguments for Weak and Strong GRP.
First, let’s specify two different ways in which a prior credence function
and a set of possible posterior credence functions, taken together, might be
flawed; the Dutch Book arguments will take some subset of these flaws to
indicate irrationality. Instead of talking about bets specifically, we’ll talk
generally about any sort of decision-theoretic act. Some terminology:
• A possible world is a classically consistent assignment of truth values
to the propositions on which the individual’s credence function is
defined—that is, the propositions in F . We denote the set of possi-
ble worlds W . Since F is a finite algebra, W is also finite. What’s
more, for each possible world w inW , there is a unique proposition
in F that is true at that world w and at no other. We abuse notation
and write w also for that proposition.
• An act is a function that assigns to each possible world the amount
of utility you receive in that world (where all utility in what follows
is measured on the same scale). Throughout, we’ll assume that there
is some commodity such that your utility is linear in that commodity,
and the outcomes of the acts we discuss involve you receiving certain
amounts of that commodity. Standard Dutch Book arguments make
a similar assumption, and usually take money as a placeholder for
this quantity. This assumption ensures two things: (i) there are con-
stant acts—acts which give you the same amount of the commodity
at each world; (ii) the utility of choosing one act in one decision prob-
lem and another act in a different decision problem is the sum of the
individual utilities of the two acts.
• If A is an act and w is a possible world, A(w) is the amount of utility
you receive if you choose A at w.
• If m is a utility level, then m is the constant act that takes that utility
at every possible world; that is, m(w) = m, for all worlds w.
• A decision problem is a set of available acts.
• If act A belongs to one decision problem and act A′ belongs to an-
other, then A + A′ is the act of choosing A from the first and A′ from
the second and its utility at w is (A + A′)(w).
• If c is a probabilistic credence function c and A and B are acts, c prefers
A to B if the expected utility of A relative to c is strictly greater than
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• If A and B are acts,
– A strongly dominates B if A(w) > B(w) for all possible worlds w;
– A weakly dominates B if (i) A(w) ≥ B(w) for all possible worlds
w, and (ii) A(w) > B(w) for some possible worlds w.
Suppose c is your credence function at t and R is the set of credence func-
tions you might have at t′.
Weak Invariable Dutch Strategy (c, R) is vulnerable to a weak
invariable Dutch strategy if there are acts A, B, A′, and B′ such
that
(i) c prefers A to B;
(ii) each ci in R prefers A′ to B′
(iii) B + B′ weakly dominates A + A′.
Weak Variable Dutch Strategy (c, R) is vulnerable to a weak
variable Dutch strategy if there are acts A, B, A′1, B
′




(i) c prefers A to B;
(ii) each ci in R prefers A′i to B
′
i
(iii) B + B′i weakly dominates A + A
′
i, for all i = 1, . . . , n.
Strong Dutch Strategy (c, R) is vulnerable to a strong Dutch
strategy if there are acts A, B, A′, and B′ such that
(i) c prefers A to B;
(ii) each ci in R prefers A′ to B′
(iii) B + B′ strongly dominates A + A′.
We can now state our Dutch Book theorem for Weak and Strong GRP:
Theorem 1
(I) (a) If (c, R) violates Weak GRP, it is vulnerable to a strong Dutch strategy.
(b) If (c, R) satisfies Weak GRP, it is not vulnerable to a strong Dutch
strategy.
(II) (a) If (c, R) violates Strong GRP, it is vulnerable to a weak invariable
Dutch strategy.
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(b) If (c, R) satisfies Strong GRP, it is not vulnerable to a weak invariable
or weak variable Dutch strategy.
I will now set out of the proof of Theorem 1(I)(a). As so often in the
theorems that accompany Dutch Book arguments, it relies on the Separat-
ing Hyperplane Theorem.7 The proof of Theorem 1(II)(a) is very similar,
but appeals to the Supporting Hyperplane Theorem instead. In this con-
text, the Separating Hyperplane Theorem says this: Suppose c is a credence
function that is not a convex combination of the credence functions in R, as
is the case when (c, R) violates Weak GRP. Then there is an act A and two
real numbers, m and m′, such that, for any ci in R,
∑
w∈W




• m′ < ∑w∈W c(w)A(w); and
• −m < ∑w∈W ci(w)(−A(w)), for i = 1, . . . , n.
Then c prefers A to the constant act m′, while each ci prefers −A to the
constant act −m. But
(A + (−A))(w) = 0 < m′ −m = (m′ +−m)(w)
That is, m′ +−m strongly dominates A + (−A). Thus, (c, R) is vulnerable
to a strong Dutch strategy, as required.
Next, we prove Theorem 1(II)(b). The proof of Theorem 1(I)(b) is very
similar. Suppose (c, R) does satisfy Weak GRP. Then c = ∑i λici. Now,
suppose c prefers A to B and ci prefers A′i to B
′
i . Then
• ∑w c(w)B(w) < ∑w c(w)A(w)
• ∑w ci(w)B′i(w) < ∑w ci(w)A
′
i(w), for i = 1, . . . , n.
7In general, the Separating Hyperplane Theorem says this: Suppose we have two subsets
X and Y of Rn that are disjoint, non-empty, and convex. Then there is a vector z and a real
number r such that, for all x in X and y in Y,



















































So it cannot be that (A + A′i)(w) < (B + B
′
i)(w) for all w. 2
4 The Accuracy Dominance argument for GRP
In the Accuracy Dominance argument for Probabilism, we show that, if
your credence function does not obey the axioms of the probability calcu-
lus, there is an alternative credence function, defined on exactly the same
propositions, that has greater accuracy than yours for sure. In Briggs and
Pettigrew’s Accuracy Dominance argument for Conditionalization, we show
that, if you plan to update your prior in some way other than by Condition-
alization, then there is an alternative prior and an alternative updating plan
that have greater total accuracy than your prior and updating plan for sure.
In the Accuracy Dominance argument for Weak GRP, we show that, if your
prior is not a convex combination of your possible posteriors, there is an
alternative prior and alternative possible posteriors, each paired with one
of your possible posteriors, such that if you were to replace your prior with
the alternative prior and each of the posteriors with its paired alternative,
you’d have greater total accuracy for sure.
First, a couple of quick words about measuring accuracy. Briggs and
Pettigrew’s argument, like the increasingly standard Accuracy Dominance
argument for Probabilism, assumes that our measures of inaccuracy have
three properties (Predd et al., 2009):
Additivity The inaccuracy of a whole credence function is the
sum of the inaccuracy of the credences it assigns.
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More precisely: If I is a legitimate measure of the inaccuracy
of a credence function at a world, then there is, for each X in
F , a scoring rule sX : {0, 1} × [0, 1] → [0, ∞] such that, for any
credence function c defined on F and any world w,
I(c, w) = ∑
X∈F
sX(vw(X), c(X))
where vw(X) = 0 if X is false at w and vw(X) = 1 if X is true at
w. In this case, we say that s generates I.
Continuity The inaccuracy of a credence is a continuous func-
tion of that credence.
More precisely: If I is a legitimate measure of inaccuracy that
is generated by the scoring rule s, then, for all X in F , sX(1, x)
and sX(0, x) are continuous functions of x.
Strict Propriety Each credence expects itself to be most accu-
rate.
More precisely: If I is a legitimate measure of inaccuracy that is
generated by the scoring rule s, then, for all X in F and 0 ≤ p ≤
1,
psX(1, x) + (1− p)sX(0, x)
is uniquely minimized, as a function of x, at x = p.
When I satisfies these three properties, we say that it is an additive and
continuous strictly proper inaccuracy measure.
Next, let’s specify a flaw that a prior and set of possible posteriors might
jointly have.
Accuracy Domination A pair (c, R = {c1, . . . , cn}) consisting
of a prior c and a set R of possible posteriors is accuracy dom-
inated iff, for all legitimate inaccuracy measures I, there is an
alternative pair (c?, R? = {c?1 , . . . , c?n}) such that, for all possible
worlds w and all i = 1, . . . , n,
I(c?, w) + I(c?i , w) < I(c, w) + I(ci, w)
And now our theorem:
Theorem 2 (c, R) violates Weak GRP iff it is accuracy dominated.
Proof of Theorem 2. Given a set of possible posteriors, R = {c1, . . . , cn}, de-
fine the following set of (n + 1)-dimensional vectors of credence functions:
R = {(vw, c1, . . . , ci−1, vw, ci+1, . . . , cn) : w ∈ W , i = 1, . . . , n}
where, again, vw is the credence function with vw(X) = 0 if X is false at w
and vw(X) = 1 if X is true at w. Then:
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Lemma 3 If c violates Weak GRP, then
(c, c1, . . . , cn) 6∈ R
+
where R+ is the convex hull of R.8
Proof of Lemma 3. To prove this, we prove the contrapositive. Suppose
(c, c1, . . . , cn) ∈ R
+. Then there are 0 ≤ λw,i ≤ 1 such that ∑w ∑i λw,i = 1
and





































Thus, c is in R+, and c satisfies Weak GRP.
Return to Proof of Theorem 2. Now, we appeal to two central facts about
additive and continuous strictly proper inaccuracy measures:
Lemma 4 (Proposition 2, (Predd et al., 2009)) Suppose I is an additive and
continuous strictly proper inaccuracy measure. Then there is a Bregman diver-
gence D such that, for any credence function c and any world w,9
I(c, w) = D(vw, c)
Thus, the inaccuracy of c at w is the divergence from vw to c.
8For the definition of the convex hull of a set, see footnote 6.
9A Bregman divergence is a certain sort of function that takes pairs of credence functions
defined on F and returns a non-negative real number or infinity. It might be thought of as
measuring the distance from one credence function to the other, but it is not required to
have certain basic properties of a measure of distance, such as symmetry and the triangle
inequality. For our purposes here, we don’t need to know anything about them except what
is stated in Lemmas 4 and 5.
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Lemma 5 (Proposition 3, (Predd et al., 2009)) Suppose D is a Bregman diver-
gence and P is a set of credence functions. Then, if c is not in P+, then there is c?
in P+ such that, for all p in P ,10
D(p, c?) < D(p, c)
Now, suppose I is an additive and continuous strictly proper inaccuracy
measure and D is its accompanying Bregman divergence. Now, suppose
(c, R) violates Weak GRP. Then
(c, c1, . . . , cn) 6∈ R
+
So, by Lemma 5, there is




such that, for all w and i,
D(vw, c?) +D(c1, c?1) + . . . +D(ci−1, c
?
i−1)+
D(vw, c?i ) +D(ci+1, c
?
i+1) + . . . +D(cn, c
?
n) <
D(vw, c) +D(c1, c1) + . . . +D(ci−1, ci−1)+
D(vw, ci) +D(ci+1, ci+1) + . . . +D(cn, cn)
Now, D(ci, c?i ) ≥ 0 for all i = 1, . . . , n. Furthermore, D(ci, ci) = 0. So we
can infer:
D(vw, c?) +D(vw, c?i ) < D(vw, c) +D(vw, ci)
And so, by Lemma 4,
I(c?, w) + I(c?i , w) < I(c, w) + I(ci, w)
as required.




Now consider c?, c?1 , . . . , c
?
n. Then, since I is strictly proper:
• ∑w c(w)I(c, w) ≤ ∑w c(w)I(c?, w)
• ∑w ci(w)I(ci, w) ≤ ∑w c(w)I(c?i , w), for i = 1, . . . , n.





λici(w)(I(c, w) + I(ci, w))
= ∑
w,i





c(w)I(c, w) + ∑
w,i
λici(w)I(ci, w) since c = ∑i λici
= ∑
w



















λici(w)I(c?, w) + ∑
w,i
λici(w)I(c?i , w) since c = ∑i λici
= ∑
w,i
λici(w)(I(c?, w) + I(c?i , w))
So it cannot be that I(c?, w) + I(c?i , w) < I(c, w) + I(ci, w) for all w inW .
2
5 Problems with Reflection
We are left, then, with two arguments for Weak GRP (and one for Strong
GRP). If you violate Weak GRP, your prior and possible posteriors are jointly
flawed in two ways. First, they require you to choose a dominated pair of
acts in certain situations. Second, there are alternatives that accuracy dom-
inate you. Provided you agree that those flaws render your priors and pos-
sible posteriors jointly irrational, we have two arguments for Weak GRP,
one pragmatic, one epistemic. And, as we noted above, with Weak GRP in
place, we can derive Conditionalization without assuming that whatever
we become certain of is true.
However, a natural worry arises. There are countless putative coun-
terexamples to van Fraassen’s original formulation of the Reflection Prin-
ciple (Talbott, 1991; Christensen, 1991; Arntzenius, 2003; Briggs, 2009). Do
they not tell equally against the formulations we’ve given here? I think not,
though as I’ll explain I’m less than fully certain.
On van Fraassen’s original formulation, the principle governs only your
prior credence function. It imposes no constraints on your future credences,
but only on the relationship between your prior opinions about your future
credences in certain matters and your prior credences in those matters. It
says that your current credence in X, conditional on your future credence
in X being r, should be r.
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Let’s consider one of the counterexamples due to David Christensen
(1991). I know that, between t and t′, I will learn no new evidence, but I
will begin to feel the effects of a hallucinogenic drug that I’ve just taken.
I also know that one of the effects is that it will make me very confident
that I can fly. The Reflection Principle deems irrational a credence function
that is simultaneously certain that my future credence that I can fly will
be high, and very confident that I cannot fly. But that seems a perfectly
rational response to the evidence I currently have.
What does the Weak GRP say about this case? It says that, if my only
possible future credence function is very confident that I can fly, while my
current credence function is very confident I cannot, then they are jointly
irrational. But that isn’t a problem. After all, I’d also agree that they are
jointly irrational, because I judge my future credences to be irrational—
they’re the result of taking a hallucinogen, and my aerial competence is
not one of the truths typically revealed by such drugs. The upshot: this
counterexample doesn’t tell equally against Weak GRP. The reason is that
the original Reflection Principle is a purely synchronic norm, while Weak
GRP is genuinely diachronic.
This might lead you to wonder how Weak GRP can help to establish
Conditionalization, which I noted at the beginning is a synchronic norm
governing the relationship between your credence function at t and your
updating plan at t, not between your credence function at t and your pos-
sible credence functions at t′. The reason is that an updating plan is a com-
mitment to having certain credence functions at t′ given certain learning
experiences prior to that. So it is reasonable to judge it by looking at what
would happen were you to follow that plan and update accordingly. If
you were to do that, then you’d have certain possible posteriors. And if
your prior together with those possible posteriors are irrational because
they violate Weak GRP, then your prior together with the updating plan
that demands those posteriors is similarly irrational.
However, a different sort of counterexample to reflection principles does
concern me. Suppose you are a permissivist about rationality. You have a
certain body of evidence that permits two different credence functions c
and c′. In the evening, at time t, your credence function is c—perhaps in
the evening, after the stress of a long day, you’re more inclined to the more
extreme of the two permissible responses. But, from past experience, you
know that, by the morning, after a long sleep during which you will gain
no new evidence, your credence function will be c′—perhaps you know
that, after some rest, the stress will dissipate somewhat and you’ll instead
favour the less extreme permissible response. So c′ is your only possible
future credence function. But it is not c. So, together, they violate Weak
GRP.
Unlike the case of the hallucinogenic drug above, in this case both cre-
dence functions are rationally permissible. So, if they are jointly irrational,
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their individual irrationality cannot be the reason. Instead, it must lie in the
move from one to the other. I find myself without a clear sense of whether
Weak GRP gives the correct verdict in this case. In the drug case, I had a
strong conviction that the prior credence function that violates Reflection
is perfectly rational. So in that case Reflection was in direct conflict with
my judgments. I have no strong conviction that the prior c and posterior
c′ are jointly rational in this case. So Weak GRP does not conflict with my
judgments. But equally I have no strong conviction that they are jointly ir-
rational. So Weak GRP does add something to my pre-theoretic judgments.
It makes a call in a case where I don’t. Ultimately, I must leave it to the
reader to determine whether they think this verdict sinks Weak GRP and
with it the Dutch Book and Accuracy Dominance arguments in its favour,
as well as the argument for Conditionalization that follows after it.
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